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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this matter was
transferred by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals. This
was done by order dated June 16, 2011, which order was filed with the Utah Court of
Appeals on the same date. This court's jurisdiction is conferred upon it pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78a-4-103(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The order of the District Court was made as a matter of law and therefore the
appellate court is not required to accept the conclusions of the District Court but show
review of the questions of law independently. Avila v. Winn, 794 P. 2d 20 (Utah 1990);
Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990).
An additional standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
granting the defendants' Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice without allowing the
Plaintiff the opportunity to argue at hearing several of this issues that are on appeal
before this court. As such, the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary,
capricious, and a clear abuse of its discretion. (R: 0219) Gillmore v. Wright, 850 P. 2d
431, 434-36, (Utah 1993).

The following issues are presented on appeal:

5
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1. Did the district court err by not following the established standard of review
under the Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)? The court ruled against a request for hearing
so the Plaintiff could argue this point. (R:0215-0219); also refer to Arrow Industries, Inc.
v. Zions National Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988)
2. Did the district court err by claiming that cases Thomas I and Thomas II were
".. .virtually identical... "71 The court ruled against a request for hearing so the Plaintiff
could argue this point. (R: 0216)
3. Did the district court err as a matter of law by claiming that the doctrine of res
judicata prevents a plaintiff from filing a subsequent complaint? The court ruled against a
request for hearing so the Plaintiff could argue this point. (R:0216)
4. Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of law by claiming that the
appellant's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred
by the one-year statute of limitation? The court ruled against a request for hearing so the
Plaintiff could argue this point. (R: 0217)
5. Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of equity when it barred the
appellant from amending his complaint to satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9b
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? The court ruled against a request for hearing so the
Plaintiff could argue this point. (R: 0219)

1

For ease of discussion, "Thomas I" refers to the original complaint filed on December
16, 2008. 'Thomas II" refers to the second complaint filed on January 7, 2011.
6
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the eight judicial District Court, for Uintah
County, the Hon. Clark McClellan presiding, wherein the court found as a matter of law,
and, ".. .based upon the courts review of the pleadings, and for good cause shown,..."
that Thomas 2 should be dismissed. (R: 0231-0233)
Course Proceedings and Disposition of the Case
On December 16, 2008, the Appellant filed a case number 080925868 in Eighth
District Court in Uintah County. On January 6, 2010, the District Court dismissed the
complaint for failure to prosecute.
On January 7, 2011, the Appellant filed complaint 110800013, which, due to new
information discovered, was based on significantly new information than the previous
case. After filing the new case, the Appellant discovered additional information that
required that he amend the original complaint and add an additional defendant and causes
of action to the complaint. This amendment was done within the defendant's answer
deadline, such that leave of court was not required.
On May 9, 2011, the District Court granted the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint and Request for Hearing and refused to consider the other pending
motions that had been subsequently filed by both sides.
The Appellant filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court who transferred the
case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Pursuant to rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
7
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Procedure, the case was before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition
because the appeal had been filed on an order that was not appealable, the court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
The Appellee's submitted and received a final order from the Eighth District
Court. The district court entered its final, appealable order on September 8, 2011.
On October 3, 2011, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order pursuant to rule
4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to allow the appeal to proceed to the next
procedural stage.
Relevant Facts
Dr. Richard Thomas had clinical privileges and medical staff membership at
Ashley Regional Medical Center and practiced there as an OB/GYN from November
2004 to October 2008. During that time, Dr. John Griffith OB/GYN, also gained clinical
privileges and medical staff membership at Ashley Regional Medical Center. While
working together and Ashley Regional Medical Center, both Dr. Thomas and Dr. Griffith
used the same billing and practice management contractor, Kent Mecham, the principal
and president of Carepoint Network. (R: 0038-0039)

Sometime early in 2008, Dr. Thomas was approached by Mr. Mecham and was
told that the billing of Dr. Griffith far exceeded that of Dr. Thomas. After further
analysis, it was discovered by both Dr. Thomas and Mr. Mecham that questionable
8
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billing techniques were being employed by Dr. Griffith. Mr. Mecham suggested that Dr.
Thomas employ similar billing techniques as those being used by Dr. Griffith. Dr.
Thomas stated to Mr. Mecham that he felt such billing practices constituted fraud and he
would not go forward with such practices. Several weeks after this meeting, Mr. Mecham
admitted to Dr. Thomas that he had disclosed the fact that Dr. Thomas was aware of the
billing practices of Dr. Griffith to Dr. Griffith and Mr. Si Hutt, the CEO of Ashley
Regional Medical Center. (R: 0039)
It was known by the medical staff membership of Ashley Regional Medical Center
that Mr. Si Hutt was not satisfied with the performance of the medical practice of Dr.
Richard Thomas, even though Dr. Thomas was not employed directly by the hospital. In
August of 2008, Hutt attended a medical staff meeting where he had informed those in
attendance that Dr. Richard Thomas's practice was not going to make it and that he was
actively recruiting another OB/GYN to replace Dr. Thomas (Dr. Thomas was not in
attendance at this meeting). However, Hutt never discussed the financial performance of
the practice with Dr. Richard Thomas prior to making such a bold statement to the entire
medical staff of the hospital. (R: 0039-0040)
Sometime during early 2008, Lifepoint Hospitals, the parent company of Ashley
Regional Medical Center, using information received from Hutt, distributed a national
recruiting notice stating as follows: (R: 0040)
OB-GYN - The Hospital had 27% grown year over year from
2006 over 2007. Many young families are moving to the area
9
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for work. Dr. Griffith has a full practice as does Dr.
Breitenbach (FP/OB). Dr. Anderson (FP/OB) is on track to
deliver about 60 babies this year. Dr. Thomas, OB/GYN who arrived 2 years before Dr. Thomas (sic) is struggling and
it appears he may not stay in the community. The new
physician would replace Dr. Thomas, as there probably is not
room for 5 OB's on staff.

It is essential to note that notwithstanding the comments made by CEO Hutt at the
medical staff meeting, September of 2008 proved to be the most revenue generating
month ever for Dr. Thomas's practice, and all indications were that his practice was only
going to grow from there.
During the month of October 2008, Dr. Thomas had two very complex medical
cases that resulted in complications. The complications that had resulted from the
surgeries of these two cases were complications that could be expected given the
complexity of the cases. Because of these two cases, Dr. Thomas's medical privileges and
medical staff membership at Ashley Regional Medical Center were summarily
suspended. (R: 0040-0041)
During the course of Thomas I, it was discovered that to protect members of
Ashley Regional Medical Centers medical staff, the medical records of the two complex
cases were found to have been altered, contained forged signatures, and physicians notes
that had been inserted days after Dr. Thomas's summary suspension. (R: 0041)

10
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Shortly thereafter Dr. Thomas proceeded through a peer review, and it was
determined that his privileges and medical staff membership at Ashley Regional Medical
Center would be permanently revoked. Another important note during this peer review
process, Dr. Griffith served as the expert witness against Dr. Thomas. At that time, Dr.
Griffith was suspected of fraudulent billing practices and was a direct competitor of Dr.
Thomas. (R: 0041)
Because Dr. Thomas lost his main source of revenue, doing deliveries and
surgeries at Ashley Regional Medical Center, his cash flow decreased immediately and
he was unable to continue financing the cost of proceeding with Thomas I. As such, on
January 6, 2010, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute.
Summary of the Argument
The District Court abused its discretion by claiming that Thomas II was virtually
identical to Thomas 1. The court also abused its discretion when it claimed that Thomas
II was based on the same allegations as Thomas I. It would appear that the court failed to
carefully review both complaints, as Thomas II is based on a significant number of
additional facts than Thomas I.
Also, the court erred when it agreed with the defendant's argument that Thomas II
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata under both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
Given the facts presented in Thomas II, it is impossible to bar the complaint by using the

11
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doctrine of res judicata under either claim preclusion or issue preclusion given the
requirements to bar a claim based on this doctrine.
Finally, the court erred by not granting the appellant his due process rights under
both federal and state law by not allowing the case to proceed at the very least through
the discovery stage of the judicial process.

ARGUMENT
Point 1 - The district court erred by not following the established standard of
review under the Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

The trial court failed to follow the established standard of review in granting the
defendants rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice. Among other things, the court
should not have granted the motion unless it appeared to assert that Dr. Thomas would
not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proven in support of his
claims. Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions National Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). In
addition, the trial court was required to "except the factual allegations of the complaint as
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light
most favorable to [Dr. Thomas]." St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); see also Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815

12
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P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991). As demonstrated below, the trial court failed to
follow these established rules, and its dismissal order should be reversed.
The amended complaint in Thomas II included facts that moved the foundation of
the case from simply one of trying to oust Dr. Thomas, who the administration didn't like,
to one where Ashley Regional Medical Center was trying to oust Dr. Thomas who knew
of fraudulent and illegal billing practices being utilized by one of its highest revenue
generating physicians.
The trial court was required to accept all of these factual allegations as true and to
construe the complaint and all reasonable inferences in favor of Dr. Thomas. Instead, it
disregarded the alleged facts and favorable inferences, concluding that in light of the
additional factual allegations included in Thomas II, res judicata precluded Dr. Thomas
from now asserting his rights under the law.

Point 2 - The district court erred by seeing the complaint from Thomas I and the
amended complaint from Thomas II as being "virtually identical".

In the District Court's summation of its Ruling and Order filed on May 9, 2011 it
states that, "... The plaintiff filed a new complaint in this case which is virtually identical
to the complaint filed in case number 080925868 except that additional individual
[Ashley Regional Medical Center] employees are named and new claims for fraud,
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress were alleged. The new
13
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complaint is based on the same allegation as the previous complaint: that the plaintiff was
the victim of a concerted effort to fabricate criticisms of his care of patients in October
2008 in order to improperly removed him from the medical staff at [Ashley Regional
Medical Center]."
As was stated previously, Thomas I and Thomas II are based on different
allegations and facts. Yes, both complaints allege that Dr. Thomas was the victim of a
concerted effort to fabricate criticisms of his care of patients to improperly remove him
from the medical staff at Ashley Regional Medical Center, but the facts and allegations as
to why he was being improperly removed are completely different in Thomas II. In
Thomas I, it was alleged that Dr. Thomas was being improperly removed simply because
of false accusations of the care of his patients. In Thomas II, the foundation of the
complaint is that Dr. Thomas was being improperly removed because of his knowledge
of the fraudulent billing practices of his direct competitor Dr. Griffith. In short, Thomas I
had to do with differences of opinion and perhaps clashes of personality, but Thomas II
clearly differentiates the two complaints with facts and allegations that his improper
removal from Ashley Regional Medical Center was due to money for both Dr. Griffith
and Ashley Regional Medical Center.
The district court drastically erred by not allowing Thomas II to proceed to the
next procedural stage and allow for the gathering of discovery to prove the two
complaints rested on significantly different facts and allegations.

14
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Point 3 - Did the district court err as a matter of law by claiming that the doctrine of
res judicata prevents a plaintiff from filing a subsequent complaint?
The district court based its decision on its application of the doctrine of res
judicata by the application of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. However if one
follows the requirements of the doctrine and its two branches, it is obvious that the
District Court erred when it dismissed portions of Thomas II.
In determining whether claims are identical for res judicata purposes, the courts
have focused on whether, "... the two causes of action rest on a different state of facts
and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of
action." Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah, 1983). One can see clearly that for res
judicata purposes, Thomas I and Thomas II are not identical, are not, "virtually
identical", and the rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a different kind.
The courts have held that there are "narrow exceptions" to res judicata, arguing
that, ".. .there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must give way to...
overriding concerns of public policy and simple justice." Federated Department Stores,
Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 402-03. Thomas II is a perfect example of a case in which
public policy and simple justice out way the requirements of the doctrine of res judicata.
In the medical field, forcing a physician out of business because he knew of improper
billing practices of his competitor is of huge concern to public policy and simple justice.
As such, the District Court grossly erred by not allowing Thomas II to go forward and the
proper evidence gathered and presented in a formal tribunal.

15
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The Supreme Court of Utah has held that in order for the doctrine of res judicata,
and more specifically claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, a plaintiff
must satisfy three requirements: First, both cases must involve the same parties or their
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third,
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Maoris & Associates,
Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 2000 UT93 (Utah, 2000) In Thomas II, different
defendants were named, and therefore, the parties involved in the case were different.
Second, in Thomas II the claims that were alleged were significantly different as to form,
facts, and allegations. Finally, Thomas I did not result in a final judgment on the merits,
as it was simply dismissed for failure to prosecute. As such, the district court's ruling
based on claim preclusion was not satisfied and the ruling should be reversed.
The second major issue considered by the District Court was the issue preclusion
branch of the doctrine of res judicata. "Under the rules of issue preclusion, the
adjudication of an issue bars its re-litigation in another action only if four requirements
are met. First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be
final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, and
competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded from litigating
the issue must be either a party to the first action or a privy of a party." Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah, 1988); Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419
(Utah 1981); Searle Bros v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). In analyzing Thomas
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II, it is plain to see that the complaint doesn't meet these four requirements for
preclusion. First, the issues in both cases are not identical. They're not even "virtually
identical" as suggested by the district court. This alone bars the district court from not
allowing the complaint to move forward based on issue preclusion. Next, the question
comes as to whether the first action was "fully, fairly and competently litigated." It's safe
to say that because the case hadn't even moved past the pleading stage and that no
discovery was completed, the action wasn't fully, fairly and competently litigated. As
such, the case should be returned to the district court for full, fair and competent
litigation.

Point 4 - Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of law by claiming that the
appellant's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are
barred by the one-year statute of limitation?

The District Court concluded that Dr. Thomas's defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations
citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(4). However, the court failed to take into
consideration Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111(1) which states, "If any action is timely filed
and the judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in the action or upon
a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff... May commence a new
action within one year after the reversal or failure." Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UTApp 383,
121 P. 3d 717 (UT, 2005)
17
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Thomas I was a failed action which failure was not upon the merits of the case, but
due to a dismissal for failure to prosecute. As such Utah code clearly allows the
commencement of a new action so long as it is commenced within one year after the
reversal or failure of the first action. Thomas II was commenced within one year after the
dismissal for failure to prosecute of Thomas I. This portion of the case should be
remanded back to the District Court for further proceedings.

Point 5 - Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of equity when it barred the
appellant from amending his complaint to satisfy the particularity requirement of
Rule 9b of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
To plead fraud was particularity, a plaintiff must allege that there was a fault
representation of an existing material fact made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose
of them do seem reliance there on, and reasonable reliance resulting in the plaintiffs
injury. Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UTApp 30, 18 P.3d 1137 (Utah App., 2001). The courts
have gone on to say that, ".. .rule 9(b) requires a complaint to recite "[t]he relevant
surrounding facts"... With sufficient articulation to show what facts are claimed to
constitute [the fraud] charges. (Quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966,
971 (Utah 1982)
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CONCLUSION
First, the trial court erred when it ordered a Dismissal with Prejudice the claims of
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation and
restraint of trade, based on the doctrine of Res Judicata.
Second, the trial court erred when it ordered a Dismissal with Prejudice the claims
of defamation and intentional infliction of emotion distress based on Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2-302(4), stating that those claims are barred by the one year statute of limitations.
Finally, the trial court erred when it ordered a Dismissal with Prejudice the claim
of fraud due to 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judgment at the trial court should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of March, 2012.

Dr. Richard V. Thomas, MD
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(1)

I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App.
P.24(f)(l) as this brief contains 4, 405 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted
by Utah R. App. P.24 (f)(1)(B).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.27(b) as this brief
has been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in size 13,
Times New Roman font.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of March, 2012.

Dr. Richard V. Thomas, MD
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